







The Problem of Language Grounding 
as a Specific Human Feature in the 
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Reid
Abstract
The paper explores the foundation of language as a specific human ability in the works of 
two representatives of modern British philosophy: Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Reid. Both 
of them share the understanding of language as a specific human feature, through which 
human beings express their thoughts. In fact, according to Hobbes, language is not only a 
specific human ability but also the basic human ability which enables the formation of all 
other abilities – including rational thinking. It elevates human beings above the world of 
animals. Language, therefore, is not something that arises out of human nature, rather the 
opposite; it is something that, in a certain way, conditions the emergence of humanity itself. 
At the same time, the problem of grounding of language is left unsolved in the philosophy 
of Thomas Hobbes. Differently, even though Thomas Reid considered all the languages in 
the world as systems of artificial signs made by human beings, he grounded them in human 
nature itself, more precisely, in something he calls “natural language”, common to all hu-
mans as rational and social beings. However, this attempt of grounding language in human 
nature faced some difficulties that made the solution, offered by this Scottish philosopher, 
inconsistent. Despite all the differences between the two philosophers, these difficulties 














See:	 Aristotle,	 Metaphysics,	 in:	 Jonathan	
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that	speech	is	something	essential	for	the	making	of	society,	because	without	
speech	 there	 would	 be	 amongst	 men	 “neither	 commonwealth,	 nor	 society,	










passions	 to	 other	 men,	 which	 is	 indispensable	 for	 the	 making	 of	 society.	
Thanks	 to	 language,	 men	 are	 capable	 of	 giving	 and	 understanding	 orders,	
which	 enables	 them	 to	 regulate	 their	 mutual	 relations	 and	 thereby	 to	 give	
















See:	 Thomas	Aquinas,	 Contra Gentiles,	 IV,	
54.	Available	at:	http://dhspriory.org/thomas/
ContraGentiles4.htm#54	 (accessed	 on	 Sep-
tember	30,	2016).
4
See:	Aristotle,	 Politics,	 in:	 Jonathan	 Barnes	
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purpose	 of	 raising	 a	 rebellion	 against	 legal	
sovereign	 is	 among	 those	 of	 Hobbes’	 great-
est	interest.	When	he	writes	about	the	things	
that	 weaken	 and	 cause	 the	 dissolution	 of	
a	 commonwealth,	 he	 is	 mostly	 concerned	
with	 “seditious	 doctrines”	 spread	 among	
subjects.	Some	of	these	are:	the	opinion	that	
private	men	can	be	 judges	of	good	and	evil	




lawful,	 etc.	 See:	 Thomas	 Hobbes,	 De cive. 
English Version,	 Clarendon	 Press,	 Oxford	
1983,	 reprinted	1998,	pp.	145–156;	T.	Hob-
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lations	 in	 terms	of	mathematic	 formulas,	but	 at	 the	 same	 time	being	 silent	
about	the	essences	or	purposes	of	things.	Philosophers	were	impressed	by	the	
results	of	such	a	procedure	and	tried	to	make	something	similar	in	philosophy.	
The	consequence	of	 this	was	 that	 since	 then	philosophy	was	not	 inquiring	
into	forms	and	purposes	of	things	anymore	as	its	task	became	describing	the	
mechanic	functioning	of	the	material	world.	This	means	that	the	Aristotelian	
doctrine	of	 the	four	causes	necessary	for	 the	explanation	of	 this	world	was	
reduced	 to	 two	causes	only	–	efficient	and	material	cause.	Naturally,	 some	
philosophers	–	 like	René	Descartes,	 the	 father	of	modern	philosophy	–	al-
lowed	for	the	existence	of	another	kind	of	reality,	namely	spiritual,	that	could	
not	be	 explained	 in	 this	way.	But	Thomas	Hobbes	 is	 a	 thoroughly	mecha-
nistic	philosopher	because,	according	to	him,	there	is	nothing	that	could	not	
be	explained	by	mechanic	causes.	That	attitude	presupposes	materialism	that	











and	 for	 this	 English	 philosopher	 sense	 “is	 nothing	 else	 but	 original	 fancy,	
caused	(…)	by	the	pressure,	that	is,	by	the	motion	of	external	things	upon	our	
eyes,	ears,	and	other	organs	thereunto	ordained”.16	The	rest	of	our	cognitive	
process	 is	 exposed	 in	 a	 similar	 way:	 imagination	 is	 “nothing	 but	 a	 decay-








of	any	 thing	existent	 in	nature,	nor	of	any	 idea	or	phantasm	formed	 in	 the	
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thing	 as	 memory,	 having	 only	 a	 different	
name	 because	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 point	
of	view	from	which	it	is	being	observed.	For	
A.	P.	Martinich	this	identification	of	memory	
with	 imagination	 is	 a	 big	 mistake	 because	
“although	 all	 imaginings	 could	 be	 traced	









See:	 W.	 Molesworth	 (ed.),	 Thomae Hobbes 
Malmesuburiensis Opera Philosophica Quae 
Latine Scripsit Omnia,	V2,	p.	89.
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W.	 Molesworth	 (ed.),	 The English Works of 
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passion,	namely	curiosity,	which	 is	 a	desire	 to	know	causes	of	everything,	
and	it	is	this	passion	that	induces	man	to	make	“notes”	as	helpful	means	to	
his	memory	in	search	for	causes.	This	enables	him	then	to	translate	his	mental	
discourse	 into	 speech.34	 Curiosity	 is	 not	 something	 innate	 to	 men	 because	
only	some	basic	appetites	“are	born	with	men;	as	appetite	of	food,	appetite	
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Thomas	 Reid,	 An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,	
Pennsylvania	 State	 University	 Press	 1997,	
reprint:	2009,	p.	50.
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This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 Reid	 ever	 endorsed	
a	 social	 contract	 theory	 as	 propagated	 by	
Hobbes,	 although	 he	 maintains	 that	 “all	 ar-
tificial	 language	 supposes	 some	compact	 or	
agreement	to	affix	a	certain	meaning	to	cer-
tain	signs”.	See:	T.	Reid,	An Inquiry into the 
Human Mind on the Principles of Common 


















T.	Reid,	Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man,	p.	26.
55
Stephen	 K.	 Land	 chooses	 and	 analyses	 six	
features	 of	 language,	 which	 this	 Scottish	
philosopher	 considers	 to	 be	 universal	 and	




See:	S.	K.	Land,	The Philosophy of Language 
in Britain,	 p.	 223.	 Similarly,	 K.	 Schumann	
and	 B.	 Smith	 state	 that	 the	 distinctions	 that	



















“As	general	words	are	so	necessary	 in	 language,	 it	 is	natural	 to	conclude	 that	 there	must	be	
general	conceptions,	of	which	they	are	the	signs.”57
But	does	he	really	manage	to	overcome	nominalism?	First	of	all,	it	is	clear	





















































Now	we	need	 to	 see	how	 this	 identification	of	conception	with	 the	opera-
tion	of	conceiving	affects	Reid’s	understanding	of	general	conceptions.	This	
Scottish	philosopher	claims	that	a	conception	counts	as	general	not	because	
of	“the	act	of	 the	mind	 in	conceiving,	which	 is	an	 individual	act”,	but	be-







attributes	which	have	been	observed	 to	be	 common	 to	 every	 individual”69	
of	 the	 same	 sort.	This,	 of	 course,	 provokes	 the	 question	 about	 the	 way	 in	
which	individuals	are	being	classified	in	sorts.	And	Scottish	philosopher	is	
very	clear	about	that	too:
sense	 of	 a	 conjecture	 that	 is	 not	 borne	 out	
by	 fact”.	See:	K.	Schumann,	B.	Smith,	 “El-
ements	 of	 speech	 act	 theory	 in	 the	 work	 of	
Thomas	Reid”,	History of Philosophy Quar-
terly	7	(1/1990),	pp.	47–669,	p.	63,	n.	20.
56
See:	S.	K.	Land,	The Philosphy of Language 
in Britain,	p.	221;	R.	Nichols,	G.	Yaffe,	„Tho-
mas	 Reid”,	 Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy.	 Available	 at:	 http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/reid/	(accessed	on	July	11,	2016).
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more	persuasive	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	grounding	 language.	However,	
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The	philosophical	background	 that	we	have	 in	mind	 is	 a	 typically	modern	






















or	 natural	 constitution	 from	 which	 all	 their	
qualities	 flow:	but	 this	 essence	our	 faculties	
do	not	comprehend:	 they	are	 therefore	 inca-
pable	of	definition;	 for	a	definition	ought	 to	
comprehend	 the	 whole	 nature	 or	 essence	 of	
the	thing	defined.”	See:	Ibid.,	pp.	394–395.
74
In	 this	 distinction	 between	 the	 real	 and	 the	
nominal	 essence,	 Reid	 is	 actually	 following	






may	not	unfitly	be	 termed,	 the	one	 real,	 the	
other	nominal	essence”.	See:	John	Locke,	An	
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Vol.	 2, Dover Publishing,	 New	 York	 1959,	
pp.	26–27.
75
T.	 Reid,	 Essays on the Intellectual Powers 
of Man,	 p.	 476.	That	 is	why	Reid	 proposes	
in	particular	cases	of	a	“monstrous	birth	of	a	
woman”	 to	 leave	 the	 evaluation	 of	 whether	
it	 is	 human	 or	 not	 “to	 the	 determination	 of	
a	 judge	 or	 of	 a	 jury”	 (Ibid.,	 p.	 476).	 Thus,	
according	 to	 this	 Scottish	 philosopher,	 the	
question	 whether	 someone	 is	 human	 or	 not	
is	 a	 matter	 of	 a	 judge’s	 evaluation.	This	 at-
titude	can	have	very	dangerous	consequences	
in	 practical	 life,	 because	 in	 circumstances	
in	 which	 we	 do	 not	 know	 what	 the	 nature	
of	 man	 is,	 every	 “birth	 of	 a	 woman”	 may	
be	declared	“monstrous”	and	brought	out	 to	
court	and,	 thus,	 left	 to	mercy	of	a	particular	
judge.	 In	 this	 view,	Reid	 is	 again	 somehow	
close	to	the	philosopher	of	Malmelsbury,	who	
says	that	“upon	occasion	of	some	strange	and	
deformed	 birth,	 it	 shall	 not	 be	 decided	 by	
Aristotle,	 or	 the	 philosophers,	 whether	 the	
same	be	a	man,	or	no,	but	by	the	laws”.	See:	
T.	Hobbes,	Elements of Law,	p.	150.	Though	
Hobbes	suggests	 to	 resolve	 these	cases	on	a	





Modern	 philosophers	 had	 pretty	 different	
views	concerning	 the	existence	of	 the	mate-
rial	world:	R.	Descartes,	for	instance,	had	to	
prove	 it,	while	N.	Malebranche	 thought	 that	
such	 a	 proof	 is	 impossible	 and	 appealed	 to	
Revelation	as	a	 trustful	 testimony	of	 the	ex-




existence	 of	 the	 material	 world	 undeniable.	




In	 support	 of	 this,	 let	 us	mention	 how	Reid	
says	 we	 often	 use	 analogical	 reasoning	 in	
what	 concerns	 the	 mind	 “but	 all	 arguments,	
drawn	from	analogy,	are	still	the	weaker,	the	
greater	 disparity	 there	 is	 between	 the	 things	
compared;	and	therefore	must	be	weakest	of	
all	 when	 we	 compare	 body	 with	 mind,	 be-
cause	there	are	no	two	things	in	nature	more	
unlike”.	See: T.	Reid,	Essays on the Intellec-
tual Powers of Man,	p.	50.
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Problem utemeljenja jezika kao ljudske 
specifičnosti u filozofiji Thomasa Hobbesa i Thomasa Reida
Sažetak
U članku istražujemo kakvo utemeljenje jezika, kao specifično ljudske sposobnosti, nude djela 
dvojice predstavnika moderne britanske filozofije: Thomasa Hobbesa i Thomasa Reida. Oba fi-
lozofa slažu se da je jezik ljudska specifičnost, koja čovjeku služi za izražavanje njegovih misli. 
Ipak, prema Hobbesu, jezik nije samo ljudska specifičnost, nego je to ujedno temeljna ljudska 
sposobnost koja omogućuje formiranje svih drugih sposobnosti – uključujući i racionalnu misao 
– koje čovjeka izdižu ponad animalnoga svijeta. Jezik, stoga, nije nešto što proizlazi iz ljudske 
naravi, nego upravo suprotno, nešto što na određeni način uvjetuje nastanak same čovječnosti. 
Istovremeno, problem utemeljenja samoga jezika ostaje neriješen u filozofiji Thomasa Hobbe-
sa. S druge strane, premda je Reid vidio sve svjetske jezike kao sustave umjetnih znakova koje 
su ljudi načinili, on je njihov temelj smjestio u samu ljudsku narav, točnije, u nešto što on naziva 
»naravnim jezikom«, zajedničkim svim ljudima kao racionalnim i društvenim bićima. No, ovaj 
pokušaj utemeljenja jezika u ljudskoj naravi nailazi na određene poteškoće, što će rješenje, 
koje nudi škotski filozof, učiniti nekonzistentnim. Te poteškoće, pak, unatoč svim razlikama koje 
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Ivana Knežić
Das Problem der Begründung der Sprache als spezifische menschliche 
Eigenschaft in der Philosophie von Thomas Hobbes und Thomas Reid
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel erforscht die Grundlagen der Sprache als spezifische menschliche Fähigkeit, in den 
Werken zweier Vertreter der modernen britischen Philosophie: Thomas Hobbes und Thomas 
Reid. Beide teilen das Verständnis der Sprache als eines spezifischen menschlichen Merkmals, 
wodurch der Mensch seine Gedanken ausdrückt. Aber nach Hobbes ist die Sprache nicht nur 
eine spezifische menschliche Fähigkeit, sondern auch die Grundfähigkeit eines Menschen, die 
ihm die Formung aller anderen Fähigkeiten – einschließlich seines rationalen Denkens – er-
möglicht, das ihn über die Welt der Tiere hebt. Die Sprache ist also nicht etwas, das aus der 
menschlichen Natur entspringt, sondern das Gegenteil, es ist etwas, das in gewisser Weise die 
Entstehung der Menschheit selbst bedingt. Gleichzeitig bleibt das Problem der Begründung der 
Sprache selbst in der Philosophie von Thomas Hobbes ungelöst. Auf der anderen Seite, obwohl 
Thomas Reid alle Sprachen der Welt als Systeme von künstlichen Zeichen der Menschen sieht, 
setzt er die Begründung der Sprache in die menschliche Natur, genauer, in das, was er die „na-
türliche Sprache“ nennt, was allen Menschen, als rationellen und sozialen Wesen, gemeinsam 
ist. Doch dieser Versuch, eine Sprache in der menschlichen Natur zu gründen, stand vor einigen 
Schwierigkeiten, welche die von diesem schottischen Philosophen angebotene Lösung inkon-
sistent machten. Diese Schwierigkeiten hingegen, trotz aller Unterschiede zwischen den beiden 




Problème de fondation du langage comme spécificité 
humaine dans la philosophie de Thomas Hobbes et de Thomas Reid
Résumé
Le présent travail explore les fondations du langage, en tant que facultés spécifiquement humai-
nes, dans les œuvres de deux représentants de la philosophie britannique moderne, en l’occur-
rence Thomas Hobbes et Thomas Reid. Tous les deux s’accordent à dire que le langage est une 
spécificité humaine qui sert l’homme à exprimer ses idées. Toutefois, si l’on en croit Hobbes, 
le langage est non seulement une spécificité humaine, mais également la capacité première des 
hommes qui les aide à former toutes les autres capacités, y compris la pensée rationnelle qui, à 
son tour, leur permet de s’élever au-dessus du monde animal. Par conséquent, le langage n’est 
pas quelque chose qui découle de la nature humaine. Au contraire, dans l’esprit du chercheur 
anglais, le langage conditionne l’avènement de leur propre humanité. Raison pour laquelle le 
problème de fondation du langage demeure non résolu dans la philosophie de Thomas Hobbes. 
Par contre, bien que Reid ait envisagé les langues étrangères comme systèmes de signes arti-
ficiels faits par les hommes, il croit pouvoir dire que leur fondement se trouve dans la nature 
humaine elle-même, ou pour être plus précis, dans ce qu’il appelle le « langage naturel », 
commun à tous les êtres humains rationnels et sociaux. Cependant, cette thèse selon laquelle le 
langage serait étroitement lié à la nature humaine a rencontré quelques difficultés, ce qui, à nos 
yeux, rend la démarche du philosophe écossais incohérente. Enfin, malgré toutes les différences 
qui existent entre les deux philosophes, ces difficultés indiquent indubitablement leur héritage 
philosophique commun.
Mots-clés
Thomas	Hobbes,	Thomas	Reid,	langage,	nominalisme,	nature	humaine
